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REVIEW ESSAY
strategic culture and ways of war ELUSIVE FICTION OR 
ESSENTIAL CONCEPT?
Frank Hoffman
Reconsidering the American Way of War: US Military Practice 
from the Revolution to Afghanistan, by Antulio J. Echevarria 
II. Washington, DC: Georgetown Univ. Press, 2014. 232 pages.
$54.95 (paperback $29.95, e-book $29.95).
Is there such a thing as “strategic culture” and a distinctive “American way of 
war”? What defines this supposedly unique approach to warfare? What elements 
or habits comprise this approach, and how has it 
been applied over the course of time? Do other 
countries have strategic cultures that shape how 
they plan and conduct strategy, and how they 
plan to conduct war? In this provocative and ag-
gressively argued book, the author explores these 
critical questions.
Dr. Antulio Echevarria brings impressive intel-
lectual credentials to this project. He has been a 
leading scholar in German military thinking of the 
nineteenth century, and his After Clausewitz: Ger-
man Military Thinkers before the Great War (Univ. 
Press of Kansas, 2001) is deservedly praised. He 
also penned a superb book on the contemporary 
relevance of Clausewitz.
Reconsidering the American Way of War has two 
central and related arguments. First, Echevarria 
argues that the very concept of a strategic culture 
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is flawed and that an American strategic culture—a culturally framed way of 
war—is not historically founded� To the author, the entire concept of a “strategic 
culture” is built entirely around vague generalities and caricatures� “The search 
for a distinctly American approach to strategy and its core determinants,” he ar-
gues, “was based more on myth and conventional wisdom than fact�”
Echevarria’s second argument involves the purported existence of a proverbial 
American way of war� He argues that many criticisms of the American way of 
war—namely, its alleged apolitical orientation, its astrategic character, and its 
emphasis on overwhelming force to obtain decisive results—cannot stand up to 
historical scrutiny� Here, over several chapters, Echevarria seeks to demonstrate 
that this characterization is inaccurate over the breadth of America’s history�
This argument runs counter to the central thrust of Russell F� Weigley’s writ-
ings and my own narrower book on U�S� military culture�1 While both of the 
author’s main contentions are argued aggressively, they remain unbalanced and 
less than compelling�
STRATEGIC CULTURE’S UTILITY
Echevarria devotes an initial chapter to debunking strategic culture’s analytical 
value� He concludes that the entire concept is little more than an elusive fiction� 
But the U�S� strategic culture he depicts is an enduring, monolithic, and excep-
tionally American construct applicable across all the national security institu-
tions, and such a depiction is too rigid—a caricature of how most scholars look 
at the role of cultural factors� The author’s narrow interpretation fails to account 
for historical influences that impact strategic culture over long and climactic 
periods� Surely, the U�S� Civil War, World War II, and the Vietnam War emphati-
cally impacted the way Americans looked at war and the utility of force� Other 
scholars, including Sir Lawrence Freedman, accept this view: “Culture, and the 
cognition which it influences[,] is rarely fixed but [is] in a process of development 
and adaptation�”2
The notion of strategic culture as a frame of reference for beginning to un-
derstand one’s adversary and the distinctive (but not predictive) approaches to 
conducting war clearly has some analytical value�3 A number of scholars in the 
strategic studies community are advocates of the concept’s utility�4 The role of 
strategic culture on strategic performance is a staple in the literature�5 A review 
of strategic culture often has been an element in net assessments� Historian Wil-
liamson Murray concludes that grand strategy—at the highest level of the expres-
sion of strategic culture—must “rest on a realistic assessment and understanding 
not only of one’s opponents but also of oneself�”6 Michael Howard’s warning is 
perhaps the most trenchant: “Wars are � � � conflicts of societies, and can be fully 
understood only if one understands the nature of the society fighting them� The 
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roots of victory or defeat often have to be sought far from the battlefield, in politi-
cal, social, or economic factors�”7 Colin Gray posits that strategic culture is not 
determinant, but does cue problem recognition and the search for solutions�8
Thus, Echevarria is pushing back against a body of scholars who contend that 
any nation’s approach to strategy and its way of fighting are framed by its culture 
and experiences�
Other scholars warn that ideas concerning ways of war tend to be used 
prescriptively—as if adversary leaders were completely constrained by them�9 
Surely, strategic culture can be taken too far if we presume it to be predictive� The 
paradoxical nature of strategy must be considered, and a government may take 
steps that are out of character (culture) to generate a surprise advantage�10
However, the reverse side of the argument is equally disconcerting� If strate-
gists, while drawing up a strategy, took Echevarria’s concerns to a logical end, 
they would not concern themselves with studying the nature of the government, 
values, experiences, geography, or technological focus of a potential adversary� 
I doubt the author intended to create that impression� However, intelligence 
shortfalls and acultural thinking about the Other are classic shortcomings in U�S� 
strategic culture� A flawed conception of Iraqi sociology and the multiethnic divi-
sions found in Iraq in 2003 certainly reinforces Gray’s depiction of the American 
way of war as “culturally challenged�”11 Lacking a deep understanding of an ad-
versary’s history, culture, sociology, and government decision-making structures 
certainly blinds one to possibilities, if not probabilities�
Dismissing the study of other cultures and their ways of war will only per-
petuate a lack of understanding of both adversary culture and the larger context 
it offers� Instead of ignoring these elements, we should make them fundamental 
considerations in the development of strategy� This conclusion is a key, indeed a 
central, insight from recent conflicts�
HISTORICAL SCOPE AND RESEARCH
The book’s scope raises several concerns� First, the author has bitten off quite a 
project on which to chew� His overview covers a sweeping range of the nation’s 
history� America’s strategic performance over two hundred years, from the de-
fense of Boston to the march on Baghdad, is covered in fewer than two hundred 
pages� American strategic planning and execution from World War I through 
World War II and the Korean conflict are connected cohesively, but are covered in 
a chapter of only twenty-two pages� Even when done by a talented historian such 
as Echevarria, it is impossible to address the conduct of U�S� strategy comprehen-
sively in such a compressed manner� Far too much depth and relevant scholarship 
were sacrificed for breadth�
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Much of that breadth is irrelevant to today’s debate� The bulk of Reconsider-
ing the American Way of War deals with the first 150 years of the history of the 
United States, during which its strategic position and interests were different 
than in the post–World War II era� Most of the criticisms of the American way 
of war (including Weigley’s classic) were written at the end of the Vietnam War 
and generally were critical of the contemporary U�S� military, especially its kinetic 
focus and emphasis on conventional application of force�12 It is with regard to this 
period that consistently limited strategic performance is blamed on U�S� strategic 
culture, military culture, or both�
Even when the more modern sections are examined, the research base is 
limited; a lot of relevant scholarship was overlooked� For example, the author’s 
section on Vietnam lays the blame on Secretary of Defense Robert S� McNamara 
for the strategy of attrition on which the United States based its operations, but 
Echevarria admits the U�S� Army maintained its focus on “search and destroy” 
operations far too long� Neither Robert Komer’s famous book on U�S� military 
culture nor Andrew Krepinevich’s critique of the Army nor Lewis Sorley’s dissec-
tion of Westmoreland’s strategy is cited�13
Echevarria’s section on the 1989–90 American intervention in Panama, Op-
eration JUST CAUSE, overlooks shortfalls in planning for what was intended to be 
Phase IV of that operation and the subsequent difficulties in establishing order�14
The brief discussion of the first Persian Gulf War and the most recent phase of 
U�S� operations inside Iraq also avoids well-documented military shortfalls, par-
ticularly poor war-termination planning that reflected a desire to avoid politics� 
As the British historian Hew Strachan has observed, the apolitical nature of the 
U�S� military is demonstrated by its strong preference for concentration on the 
operational level of war, as a “politics-free zone�”15 The U�S� strategy in Iraq for 
2003 was far too focused on the initial conventional battle, and again was devoid 
of political context� This was demonstrated when Commander, U�S� Central 
Command General Tommy Franks told senior Defense Department officials 
that he would focus on the day of battle and they could deal “with the day after�” 
Such attitudes reflect shortcomings in our understanding of what constitutes war, 
as well as in the leadership development of U�S� generals�16 But General Franks’s 
comment and memoirs are not cited in the three pages this book devotes to 
America’s longest war�
Echevarria concludes that the purported habits that characterize the Ameri-
can way of war are simply erroneous� In his interpretation, American strategy in 
practice has been flexible and appropriately crafted for both irregular conflicts 
and major wars� He finds (pp� 164, 174) that “the American way of war has been 
nothing less than political in every respect and in every period of its history� � � � 
It is clear that both policy and politics have influenced U�S� military practice�” If 
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there is a consistent mental frame, it is the mistaken belief that “tactical victory 
redounds in favor of strategic success�”
This assessment is hard to square with any objective evaluation of the last 
fifteen years� The American way of war has influenced profoundly U�S� war 
planning and strategic performance in Iraq and Afghanistan� During Opera-
tions ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, success was elusive� Some of 
these failures may be attributed to senior civilian leaders, while others relate to 
flaws in strategy or implementation that can be laid at the feet of U�S� military 
commanders; both represent components of strategic culture� But Echevarria 
never examines subcomponents of a national culture nor alters his level of 
analysis� The Joint Chiefs of Staff ’s own conclusions about operational lessons 
from those conflicts suggest that U�S� military campaigns were limited by a lack 
of understanding about adversaries and by a “Big War” mind-set� These lessons, 
including the Joint Chiefs of Staff ’s own lessons-learned product, Enduring Les-
sons from the Past Decade of Operations, are absent from Echevarria’s history and 
bibliography�17 Those candid evaluations found that U�S� experiences in Iraq and 
Afghanistan reflected apolitical thinking, astrategic logic, and ahistorical reason-
ing� These attributes were not just evident but conspicuous, both at the national 
level and within the U�S� military’s plans� They were key contributors to failure, if 
one objectively assesses our shortfalls� Others have noted these elements, but the 
author does not counter their arguments�18 To contend that flaws in the American 
conceptual approach to war and strategy do not exist and do not help to account 
for the limited success the United States has obtained in two protracted contests 
over the last fifteen years may be the biggest hole in Echevarria’s argument� This 
perspective, should it become the revealed wisdom of the last two wars, would 
perpetuate shortfalls in how strategists think about war, how the U�S� military 
prepares for warfare across the range of military operations, and how students 
are taught about their profession�
Dr� Echevarria’s two major arguments are presented cogently, but fall short of 
convincing� The author is correct that examining strategic culture offers limited 
predictability, but he is wrong to claim that it offers neither insights nor explana-
tory power� If we ignore a deep grasp of strategic culture—our own as much as 
others’—we will ensure that the lessons encountered during the last fifteen years 
will have to be dealt with again in our next war(s)� Policy makers and military 
planners should want to know more about the strategic culture of potential op-
ponents and how it influences their decision making, not less�19
Reconsidering the American Way of War makes a material contribution to the 
long-standing debate about strategic culture, especially by highlighting limits 
to the construct and its usage� But embracing Echevarria’s perspective about 
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strategic culture in general or the American way of war in particular overlooks 
extensive evidence and criticism about U�S� strategic competence�20 If you want to 
understand why tactical brilliance is undone by slipshod strategic thinking, you 
will not find the answer here; those who seek a better American way of war must 
look elsewhere�21 There are no arguments here for overcoming, by education or 
process, America’s penchant for deficient strategy� Despite an increasingly disor-
dered world, Echevarria apparently perceives neither need nor grounds for alter-
ing a paradigm that is skewed heavily toward kinetic solutions and conventional 
fighting, regardless of our enemies�22
This book should stimulate a necessary debate as today’s generation of veter-
ans on both sides of the Atlantic steps back to examine the last two wars� Learning 
from and modifying entrenched behaviors after major wars are not easy feats�23 
With Britain’s Chilcot inquiry there has been at least one serious effort to do so by 
one of our allies, but there is little appetite in the United States for such reviews� 
Yet tomorrow’s leaders should recognize the limitations strategic culture offers 
in predicting how our adversary’s strategy will be formulated, how another actor 
may think about war and warfare, and how we should understand our opponent’s 
approach to warfare� Just as importantly, we must better understand ourselves�24
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